Related Links
Peace Convention in Lahore Attracts Attention
Second Teleconf. Connects Kids in Rohtak, Hyderabad
Peace ByCycle
Plans for a Second Peace March

After the 26/11 incident the peace process had derailed completely. India had refused to talk until Pakistan took action against those responsible for the attack. But then India turned around and became agreeable to talking. Some say it was US pressure. It could be India's magnanimity. It could also be that India realised that even to extract results out of Pakistani establishment against the perpetrators of 26/11 it needed to do talking.

Now, there is a strange thing between India and Pakistan. When meeting in private everybody, except maybe the real hardliners, will genuinely express the desire to establish peace and friendship between the two countries. The common people, anyway, on both sides have gotten sick of the atmosphere of animosity. Their biggest demand has been lifting the restrictions on travel across the border. But during official meetings a sense of antagonism seems to take over. A fear that by talking about peace and friendship one should not appear weak.

There may not be a desire to stage one-upmanship but there is definitely a fear that one should not appear to be giving in too much to the opposition. It becomes a matter of prestige so much so that any genuine progress in talks becomes difficult. And no side wants to appear to be overcoming their silly egos. That is where the talks get stuck. Even if the political leadership is willing, there are elements in military and ISI in Pakistan and bureaucracy in India who are skeptical. When the political leadership has been forthcoming there have been gains.

Resumption of bus services, trains and trade are a few examples. Of course, these are not major gains. But even to get them in place required decisions at the highest level.

Shah Mehmood Qureshi also happens to be the Sajjada Nashin of Dargah of Sufi saint Bahauddin Zakaria in Multan. In 2005 when a Delhi-Multan peace march on the initiative of civil societies of both countries reached his mazar for the culmination of the march he said something which people in Pakistan would normally avoid saying. He said that like the wall between the two Germanies, the border between India and Pakistan would come down one day. In a country whose identity depends on the `two nation theory' and the history of partition, a statement of this nature is seen as a threat to its existence. In fact peace activists from India travelling to Pakistan are alerted not to say anything, even emotionally, hinting to undoing the partition. This is immediately perceived as patronising by the big brother.

We are witnessing a different Qureshi as the Foreign Minister. But then we have to realise that Qureshi as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan is under tremendous pressure when he goes to dialogue with India. In addition to representing the views of his government, he has also to worry about how the army, ISI and even the terrorist groups will react to what he says or does. It is almost like walking a tight rope.

The expectation of the Indian government is that Pakistani government will take some concrete action against those responsible for the 26/11 attacks. Take the case of Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba. At one point in time he has been very close to the establishment. The fear in Pakistani establishment is that any action against him could provoke him to reveal details, which will put some very influential people in Pakistan in a very embarrassing situation. Hence the FIR lodged against him doesn't even link him to the Mumbai attack. Does SM Krishna expect SM Qureshi to commit himself to handing over Hafiz Saeed to India or allow Indian interrogators access to Hafiz Saeed? Is Shah Mehmood Qureshi even empowered to take that decision?

So the expected outcome of pressure created by the Indian foreign minister on his Pakistani counterpart to produce some results on 26/11 was for Shah Mehmood Qureshi to stonewall the process by bringing up a counter issue. It happened to be the statement issued by Indian Home Secretary GK Pillai about ISI's involvement in the 26/11 attack, as information received from Hadley. It could have been Kashmir.

A relationship, which has continued not on the basis of trust but on a policy of `tit-for-tat,' cannot be expected to suddenly turn friendly. But as Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik said, "The consolation is that we're talking.

What option do we have but to talk? Can the Indian government afford a weaker Pakistani government? It would shudder to think that some day it might have to negotiate for peace with the army, the ISI or any of the umpteen terrorist groups. For the Pakistani government they cannot afford more trouble than they are already dealing with. A friendly relation with India would benefit them in more ways than one.

One area, which could tangibly normalise relations and pave way for further progress on other matters, is relaxation of travel restrictions across border. Some of these restrictions don't really make any sense. For example, if you're crossing Wagah border on foot you require permission from your own Home Ministry in addition to a visa from the other country. This requirement is not there if one is going by air, train or bus. One can leave the other country only in the same manner as one has entered. So, if you've gone to Pakistan by bus you can't come back flying. The High Commissions will not accept an application for visa until the names have been cleared by their Home Ministries back home.

Dr Sandeep Pandey
(The author is a Ramon Magsaysay Awardee 2002, was one of the key organizers of Delhi-Multan Peace March 2005, and is also one of the key leaders organizing the India Pakistan Peace Caravan, 2010. Email: ashaashram@yahoo.com)