Recommendations for the Whistleblower Bill - 2010 The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice has begun hearing people's depositions on how the Whistleblower Bill could be strengthened. Some recommendations for public discussion by Venkatesh.
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The Public Interest Disclosure and Protection to Persons Making the Disclosures Bill, 2010
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING  THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION REGIME IN INDIA
 
Introduction
The Government of India has found it expedient to table The Public Interest Disclosure and Protection  to  Persons  Making  the  Disclosures  Bill,  2010  (the  Bill/Whistleblower  Bill).  The Department  related  Standing  Committee  of  Parliament  on  Personnel,  Public  Grievances, Law  and  Justice  sought  views  from  the  people  of  India  on  the  contents  of  the  Bill  after placing  its  contents  in  the  public  domain.  CHRI  prepared  and  disseminated  a  comparative study analysing the Bill from the point of view of international best practice standards. This study compared the Whistleblower Bill with the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informers  Bill  (LCI  Bill)  prepared  by  the  Law  Commission  of  India  in  2003.  CHRI demonstrated  how  the Whistleblower  Bill  fell  short  of  matching  most  of  the  international best practice standards as well as those recommended in the Law Commission’s draft Bill.  
 
Given  below  is  a  set  of  recommendations  that  have  the  potential  of  strengthening  the protection  regime  that the  Whistleblower  Bill  seeks  to establish. The tabular  format  given below  identifies  major  aspects  of  the  Bill  that  need  improvement  and  contains recommendations based on both national and international best practice standards and the rationale  behind  them.  Where  appropriate,  reference  will  be  made  to  the  best  practice adopted  in  one  or  more  countries  included  in  the  comparative  study  mentioned  above.
These recommendations are being made with the following objectives:‐
• providing a safe alternative to silence for the potential whistleblower and  
• ensuring that the national motto: “Satyamēva jayate” (“truth alone triumphs”) is upheld.

Key Issues and Recommendations for Change
1.      Coverage: Scope of wrongdoings is limited
a) Provision(s):  
Preamble and Clause 2(d)
b) Problem area:  
The description of wrongdoing that may be disclosed under the Bill is severely limited. For example  human  rights  violations  have  not  been  included  despite  this  being  a  rampant problem across the country. Other kinds of improprieties that may have adverse effect on public  health,  safety  and  environment  are  not  included  if  they  cannot  be  identified  as criminal offences.  
c) Rationale for improvement:
In  countries  that  have  instituted  comprehensive  Whistleblower  protection  regimes  a whistleblower  is  protected  for  disclosing  any  violation  of  the  law  occurring  in  a  public authority.  For  example  see  the  provisions  relating  to  similar  laws  operational  in  Canada,
Romania and Uganda under Standard #2 discussed in the comparative study.
d) Recommendation:
Clause  2(d)  may  be  amended  to  include  violation  of  any  law  operational  in  the  country that is or is intended to be committed by public servants.
 
2.      Coverage: Council of Ministers has been left out
a) Provision(s):  
Preamble and Clause 2(i)
b) Problem area:  
The Bill does not cover wrongdoing committed or intended to be committed by members of the Council of Ministers.  
c) Rationale for improvement:
With the exception of the USA, all other countries included in the comparative study have instituted comprehensive Whistleblower protection. For example see the provisions relating to similar laws operational in Canada, Ghana, New Zealand, Norway, Romania and Uganda Standard  #3  discussed  in  the  comparative  study.  (USA  does  not  have  Westminster  style government.) The LCI Bill covered Ministers as well.
d) Recommendations:
• Clause 2(i) may be amended to include Ministers under the ambit of the Bill.
• A  comprehensive  Lok  Pal  Bill  be  immediately  enacted  in  order  to  provide  for  the investigation  of  wrongdoing  by  individuals  occupying  the  position  of  Prime  Minister, Chief Minister and Minister.

Coverage: Armed Forces have been left out
a) Provision(s):  
Clause 3(1)
b) Problem area:  
Armed  forces  matters  and  personnel,  forces  maintaining  law  and  order,  intelligence  and counter  intelligence  agencies  and  employees  maintaining  telecommunications  of aforementioned organisations are exempt.
c) Rationale for improvement:
The  Bill  insulates  crucial  bodies  involved  in  defence  and  law  enforcement  services  and maintenance of related communications facilities. This exemption is a perversion of Article 33  of  the  Constitution  along  which  it  is  closely  modeled.  Article  33  permits  Parliament  to
make  laws  that  would  impose  restrictions  on  the  extent  to  which  the  fundamental  rights and freedoms guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are enjoyed by the members of such  services.  The  limitation  on  the  fundamental  rights  enjoyed  by  members  of  such services is justified on the basis of the need for proper discharge of duties and maintenance of discipline. The Notes on Clauses attached to the Bill does not explain the rationale behind this clause.  
 
It  is  common  knowledge  that  where  power  is  concentrated  without  adequate  checks  and balances  the  tendency  to  abuse  such  power  grows  with  impunity.  Allegations  of  abuse  of power by armed forces when deployed on law and order or counter‐terrorism duties are not uncommon. Human rights violations committed by forces charged with the maintenance of
law and order such as the police are only growing in number despite the adoption of several measures  to  prevent  such  abuse  of  power.  Given  this  scenario  there  is  no  rationale  for exempting the armed forces from the coverage of the Bill. In countries like the Ghana, New Zealand,  South  Africa  and  Uganda  such  services  are  not  excluded  from  the  coverage  of whistleblower laws. In USA special laws have been enacted to enable armed forces to make disclosures  of  wrongdoing  in  confidence  to  Inspectors  General  and  members  of  the  US Congress.  For  example  see  the  statutory  provisions  relating  to  these  countries  under Standard #5 discussed in the comparative study.

d) Recommendation:
Clause  3(1)  may  be  amended  to  bring  the  armed  forces,  forces  engaged  in  the maintenance of law and order and bodies providing telecommunications services to such bodies within the purview of the protective regime of the Bill.

Coverage: Private sector has been left out
a) Provision(s):  
Preamble and Clause 2
b) Problem area:  
The Bill covers whistleblowers in the private sector who disclose wrongdoing in any public authority. However wrongdoing in the private sector has been left out of the ambit of the Bill.
 
c) Rationale for improvement:
In  its  4th  report  entitled:  Ethics  in  Governance,  the  Second  Administrative  Reforms Commission  recommended  that  a  comprehensive  whistleblower  protection  law  cover  the private sector as well. The Government of India accepted this suggestion. However the Bill does not cover the private sector. The whistleblower provisions contained in The Companies Bill,  2009  tabled  in  Parliament  does  not  protect  an  employee  of  a  private  company  from harm if he or she were to blow the whistle on internal wrongdoing. Further, the scope of the term  wrongdoing  is  very  limited.  Despite  the  Department  related  Standing  Committee  of Parliament  on  Finance  recommending  enlargement  of  the  scope  of  these  provisions  in  its recent  report  the  recommendation  provides  for  whistleblowing  mechanisms  that  are internal to a private body. There is no elaborate mechanism to protect whistleblowers nor are  there  serious  consequences  to  employees  who  take  retaliatory  action  against
whistleblowers.
 
The  whistleblower  laws  of  Ghana,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Uganda  and  the  UK  protect whistleblowers  in  the  private  sector  as  well.  In  South  Africa,  both  the  special  law  on whistleblowing and the Companies Act of 2008 facilitate private sector whistleblowing and provide  protection  for  such  actions.  In  the  USA  special  laws  have  been  passed  to  protect whistleblowers  in  the  private  sector.  These  provisions  are discussed  under  Standard  #4  of the comparative study and provide useful models to adopt in India.

d) Recommendation:
The  Preamble  and  Clause  2  of  the  Bill  may  be  amended  to  include  the  private  sector within its ambit.

Procedures: Single point for receiving public interest disclosures
a) Provision(s):  
Clause 2(b) and 3(2)
b) Problem area:  
The  Bill  provides  for  only  one  point  for  receiving  disclosures  of  wrongdoing  namely  the Competent Authority in the States and at the Centre.  
c) Rationale for improvement:
Whistleblower  protection  laws  across  the  world  provide  for  both  internal  and  external mechanisms  for  making  public  interest  disclosures.  A  whistleblower  may  make  disclosures of  wrongdoing  through  procedures  established  within  the  body  where  he  or  she  is
employed or to the head of such body. He or she may also make confidential disclosures to regulatory bodies or other designated authorities. Subject to certain conditions some laws allow for disclosures to be made to any other person including members of the respective parliaments  and  the  media.  The  internal  and  external  procedures  for  whistleblowing established  in  countries  such  as  Canada,  Ghana,  New  Zealand,  Uganda  and  the  United Kingdom.  The  purpose  of  providing  multiple  choices  is  to  make  available  to  the  potential whistleblower  safe  alternatives  to  disclosing  wrongdoing  internally.  These  provisions  are discussed under Standard #15 of the comparative study.
 
Restricting the potential whistleblower to only one option such as the Competent Authority like the Central Vigilance Commission may not be the best way to inspire confidence in the minds of potential whistleblowers.

d) Recommendation:
Clauses 2(b) and 3(2) of the Bill may be amended to provide multiple points where public interest disclosures may be made including members of parliament and the mass media subject to reasonable conditionalities.

Procedures: Undue burden on whistleblowers
a) Provision(s):  
Clause 2(d), 3(3) and 3(4)
b) Problem area:  
The  Bill  requires  the  whistleblower  to  make  a  disclosure specifically  naming  the  public servant  responsible  for  or  involved  in  the  wrongdoing.  Further,  the  whistleblower  is required  to  submit  supporting  documents  and  other  material  in  support  of  his  or  her
disclosure. This is too high a burden on potential whistleblowers who may not have all the data.  

c) Rationale for improvement:
Most whistleblower protection laws around the world are designed to ensure that credible information about wrongdoing is received by the concerned authorities so that inquiries and investigations  may  be  conducted.  Merely  filing  a  complaint  on  the  basis  of  hearsay  is discouraged.  However  these  laws  do  not  impose  a  huge  burden  on  the whistleblower  to marshal all names, facts and documents prior to making the disclosure. The purpose of the whistleblower law must be to enable disclosure of wrongdoing irrespective of the identity of the  wrongdoer.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  inquiring  authority  to  establish  the  identities  of wrongdoers  in  order  to  bring  them  to  book  based  on  the  information  received  from  the whistleblower. These best practice standards are discussed at Standards #16 and 19 in the comparative study.

d) Recommendation:
Clauses  2(d),  3(3)  and  3(4)  of  the  Bill  may  be  amended  to  require  the  whistleblower  to provide  credible  information  of  wrongdoing  in  good  faith  not  based  merely  on  hearsay. However there should not be any requirement of mentioning specific names or providing
copies of documents. Mere statement of facts which can be borne out by the inquiry later should suffice for the purpose of making the public interest disclosure.


Procedures: Endangering the whistleblower
a) Provision(s):  
Clause 4(4)
b) Problem area:  
The  Bill  actually  permits  the  Competent  Authority  to  disclose  the  identity  of  the whistleblower  to  the  Head  of  the  department  or  organisation  for  the  purpose  of  seeking comments or explanations on the public interest disclosure received. This virtually amounts to  a  death  sentence  being  passed  on  the  whistleblower  and  will  encourage  taking  of retaliatory action by his or her colleagues or seniors.
c) Rationale for improvement:
Some  countries  like  Canada,  Ghana  and  Uganda  require  the  identity  of  the  whistleblower confidential to be  kept  confidential.  However others such  as South Africa,  the UK and the USA do not place a premium on keeping the identity of the whistleblower secret. However even in these countries the name of the whistleblower cannot be disclosed without his or
her express consent. Ensuring the safety of the whistleblower is as important as conducting the inquiry or investigation into wrongdoing. These provisions are discussed under Standard #13  of  the  comparative  study.  If  the  whistleblower  has  no  say  in  the  decision‐making process about disclosure of his or her identity not many people will come forward and put
themselves at risk by making public interest disclosure.

d) Recommendation:
Clause 4(4) of the Bill may be amended to ensure that the identity of the whistleblower is not disclosed without his or her written consent prior to such disclosure.


Procedures: Dealing with cases involving exercise of discretion
a) Provision(s):  
Clause 5(4)
b) Problem area:  
The Bill prohibits the Competent Authority from questioning any bona fide action or bona fide  discretion  (including  administrative  or  statutory  discretion)  exercised  in  discharge  of duty by the employee.
c) Rationale for improvement:
This Clause is not in tune with the intention of the Bill. One of the objectives of the Bill is to provide  for  inquiring  into  willful  misuse  of  power  and  discretion  alleged  by  the whistleblower. Until and unless inquired into how is it possible to establish that the alleged action  was  done  in  a  bona  fide  or  mala  fide  manner?  Jurisprudence  in administrative  law requires  that  discretionary  actions  also  be  informed  by  some  reasonable  criteria.  This provision makes no sense and does not aid the achievement of the objectives of the Bill.

d) Recommendation:
Clause 5(4) may be deleted.  


 Procedures: Transparency in the outcomes of cases
a) Provision(s):  
Clause 4(6)
b) Problem area:  
The  Bill  does  not  require  the  Competent  Authority  to  inform  the  whistleblower  of  the progress made in the inquiry into wrongdoing disclosed by him or her. Similarly there is no requirement on the Competent Authority to record a detailed speaking order while closing a matter. There is no requirement to make public the outcomes of a case inquired into by the
Competent Authority.
c) Rationale for improvement:
This  Clause  is  not  in  tune  with  best  practice  standards.  In  Canada  and  the  USA  the whistleblower is informed of the progress made in his or her case and the final outcome of the inquiry launched by the competent authorities. This is a requirement of disclosure which is in public interest. The whistleblower regime in Norway also requires the outcome of an inquiry to be made public after completion. These provisions are discussed under Standard #12  of  the  comparative  study.  As  the  outcome  of  the  inquiry  has  a  direct  bearing  on  the whistleblower’s  interests  the  Competent  Authority  is  mandatorily  required  to  provide
reasons for closure under Section 4(1)(d) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Similarly the Competent  Authority  is  required  to  announce  the  outcomes  of  the  case  to  the  general public as is the requirement under Section 4(1)(c) of the Right to Information Act.
d) Recommendation:
Clause 4 may be amended to provide for the following:
• The whistleblower must be kept informed about the progress of inquiry made into the allegation of wrongdoing.
• The  Competent  Authority  must  provide  a  detailed  order  indicating  the  reasons  for closing a case and furnish a copy to the whistleblower immediately and free of cost.
• The Competent Authority must place in the public domain the details of the outcome of every inquiry launched subsequent to a public interest disclosure received.


Procedures: Bureaucratic veto on disclosure of information
a) Provision(s):  
Clause 7
b) Problem area:  
The  Bill  exempts  disclosure  of  information  which  may  prejudicially  affect  the  sovereignty and  integrity  of  India,  the  security  of  the  State,  friendly  relations  with  foreign  countries, public  order,  decency  or  morality  or  in  relation  to  contempt  of  court, defamation  or incitement  to  an  offence.  Disclosure  of  proceedings  of  the  Union  or  State  Cabinet  or  its committee is prohibited. Such records may not even be disclosed during the inquiry into an allegation of wrongdoing made under the Bill. A certificate issued by an officer of the rank of Secretary to Government for this purpose will be binding and conclusive.
c) Rationale for improvement:
This Clause is a throwback to the 19th century and is modeled along the lines of Sections 123 and  124  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872.  According  to  these  provisions  a  head  of  a government  department  may  refuse  to  produce  information  contained  in  unpublished papers relating to the affairs of the State to a court of law by citing public interest. This is known  as  ‘public  interest  immunity’‐  a  claim  that  the  Government  can  make  in  a  court  of law  through  affidavit.  The  Bill  seems  to  have  been  drafted  in  complete  ignorance  of  the jurisprudence developed around these provisions as also Section 162 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is settled law that such information cannot be denied to a court of law any more. In a catena of cases the Supreme Court has held that the court has residual powers to examine the document in camera to determine whether the ‘immunity’ has been properly claimed,
that the information is truly related to the affairs of the State and that public interest will be harmed by disclosing it to the opposite parties. Clause 7 is in violation of this settled law. All documents  relating  to  a  case  must  be  delivered  to  the  competent  authority  or  court  for
examination. ‘Sealed cover‐procedure’ may be adopted for sensitive matters.
d) Recommendation:
Clause 7 may be amended to provide for the disclosure of sensitive information belonging to  the  specified  categories  in  sealed  cover  to  the  Competent  Authority  or  the  Court  for examination.

Safeguards: Onus to protect the whistleblower and RTI applicants
a) Provision(s):  
Clause 10 and Chapter V
b) Problem area:  
i)  The  Bill  states  that  the  onus  of  protecting  a  whistleblower  will  be  on  the  Central Government. There is no mention of the State Governments in this context.
ii)  There  is  no  provision  for  protecting  whistleblowers  in  the  non‐government  and  citizen sector especially, citizens who unearth corruption using The Right to Information Act, 2005.
c) Rationale for improvement:
This  clause  is  poorly  drafted.  It  is  obvious  that  in  a  quasi‐federal  setup  the  Central Government  cannot  provide  protection  for  employees  of  the  State  Government.  The  Bill must authorize the State Governments to protect their whistleblowing employees.
 
In recent times attacks on citizens who use The Right to Information Act, 2005 to unearth corruption  and  wrongdoing  in  government  has  increased  manifold.  They  are  attacked  by vested  interests  who  are  in collusion  with  elements  within  the  government  offices.  As Section 3(1) of the Bill recognises even private individuals as potentialwhistleblowers, RTI users can be protected from victimisation. This can be done by including a provision in the Bill  that  places  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  public  authority  that  dealt  with  the  RTI application  that  it  did  not  disclose  the  contents  of  the  RTI  application  filed  by  the  person attacked without lawful and proper procedure.
d) Recommendations:
• Clause  10  of  the  Bill  may  be  amended  to  make  State  Governments  responsible  for ensuring the safety of their whistleblowing employees.
• A new Clause may be inserted in Chapter V to ensure that the burden of proving that an RTI application was not disclosed to any stranger without proper authorization shall be on the public authority dealing with the RTI application.


Safeguards: Victimisation of the whistleblower
a) Provision(s):  
Clauses 2, 10 and Chapter V
b) Problem areas:  
i)  The  Bill  does  not  contain  any  provision  about  burden  of  proof  of  victimisation  of  or retaliatory action initiated against the whistleblower.
 
ii)  The  Bill  is  also  silent  on  what  actions  and  omissions  amount  to  reprisals  or  retaliatory action against the whistleblower.
c) Rationale for improvement:
i)  In  order  to  become  an  effective  law  the  Bill  must  recognise  all  kinds  of  action  and omissions that may be considered reasonably as being retaliatory against the whistleblower. The whistleblower protection laws of Canada, Ghana, New Zealand, South Africa, Romania, the UK  and the USA clearly define as to what kinds of action constitute retaliatory action.
This could be in the form of transfer, demotion, denial of promotion, shifting to jobs with lesser  responsibilities  as  compared  to  the  qualifications  of  the  whistleblowing  employee, reduction  in  salary,  denial  or  increments  etc.  These  best  practices  are  discussed  under
Standard #6 of the comparative study.
 
ii) The Bill must provide a safe alternative to silence for the whistleblower. One of the ways of  doing  this  is  to  ensure  that  he  or  she  is  not  required  to  prove  that  victimisation  or retaliatory action occurred. A mere allegation of victimisation is enough to start the inquiry proceedings.  It  is  international  best  practice  to  place  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  public authority  concerned  that  the  retaliatory  action  did  not  occur  or  any  administrative  action that was taken against the whistleblowing employee would have been taken even if he or she had not made the public interest disclosure. This is the standard in countries like Ghana, Norway, New Zealand, Romania, South Africa, the UK and the USA. The relevant provisions contained in their whistleblower laws are discussed under Standard #18 of the comparative study.

d) Recommendations:
• Clause 2 may be amended to include a definition of the kinds of action and omissions that will be treated as retaliatory action or reprisal against a whistleblower.
• Clause 10 of the Bill may be amended to include a provision reversing the burden of proof on the employer in every allegation of victimisation and retaliatory action.


 Safeguards: Disincentives for victimisers
a) Provision(s):  
Chapter VI
b) Problem area:  
The  Bill  is  silent  on  the consequences  that  may  entail  for  any  person  that  may  victimise  a whistleblower or take retaliatory action against him or her.
c) Rationale for improvement:
A good whistleblower protection law must create disincentives for any person who seeks to victimise a whistleblower. This is one of the necessary safeguards for a whistleblower and goes  a  long  way  in  ensuring  him  or  her  a  safe  alternative  to  silence.  In  Canada  a  detailed
procedure  is  given  in  the  whistleblower  law  for  launching disciplinary  action  against  an official who takes retaliatory action against a whistleblower. In New Zealand such retaliatory action  is treated  as  a  human  rights  violation.  In  Uganda  an  official  who  victimises  a whistleblower  may  face  a  prison  term  of  up  to  five  years  and  a  hefty  fine.  In  the  USA  a federal  employee  who  victimises  a  whistleblower  may  face  suspension,  reprimand, reduction  in  grade  or  even  a  monetary  penalty.  These  best  practices  are  discussed  at Standard #17 in the comparative study.
d) Recommendation:
Chapter VI may be amended to include a penalty provision for any person who victimises or  takes  retaliatory  action  against  a  whistleblower.  The  penalty  could  be  a  maximum prison term of five years and or a fine of up to Rs. 50,000.
 
14.        Safeguards: Provision of interim relief to the whistleblower
a) Provision(s):  
Chapter V
b) Problem area:  
The Bill is silent on providing interim relief except ordering status quo ante.
c) Rationale for improvement:
Merely  ordering  status  quo  ante  is  not  enough  to  alleviate  the  suffering  caused  to  the whistleblower  due  to  retaliatory  action.  The  Bill  must  clearly  specify  the  kinds  of  interim relief that a whistleblower may claim if the Competent Authority finds that the allegation of victimisation  is  required  to  be  investigated.  The  LCI  Bill  did  contain  provisions  for  making interim  orders  to  alleviate  the suffering  of  the  victimised  whistleblower,  However  this provision  is  missing  from  the  current  Bill.  The  laws  of  New  Zealand,  the  UK  and  the  USA contain provisions for giving interim relief to the victimised whistleblower. These provisions are discussed at Standard #14 of the comparative study.
d) Recommendations:
Chapter V of the Bill may be amended to enable the Competent Authority to grant interim relief to the victimised whistleblower.


 Safeguards: Whistleblower’s right of appeal
a) Provision(s):  
Chapter VII
b) Problem area:  
The  Bill  does  not  provide  the  whistleblower  any  right  of  appeal  against  the  order  of  the Competent Authority except when a penalty is imposed for making mala fide disclosure.
c) Rationale for improvement:
The Bill must provide the whistleblower with the right of appeal if he or she is aggrieved by any order of the Competent Authority. As the right of appeal is not a common law right it must be created specifically in the statute.
d) Recommendations:
Chapter VII  of the Bill  may  be amended in order to provide for a  right  of appeal  for the whistleblower  if  he  or  she  is  aggrieved  by  any  order  of  the  Competent  Authority.  Such right of appeal may lie in the High Court of appropriate jurisdiction.
 
 
 Safeguards: Protect those who volunteer information  
a) Provision(s):  
Chapter VII
b) Problem area:  
The  Bill  does  not  provide  express  protection  to  any  person  who  may  voluntarily  come forward  to  provide  additional  or  related  information  about  a  wrongdoing  that  is  being inquired into, subsequent to a disclosure made by  the  whistleblower under this law.  Such persons are also likely to be victimised by vested interests in the public authority.
c) Rationale for improvement:
The  Bill  must  automatically  provide  similar  degrees  of  protection  as  is  available  to  the original  whistleblower  to  any  person  who  may  volunteer  information  related  to  a wrongdoing that is being investigated under this law. However such protection may not be automatically available to a person who provides information upon being compelled under the inquiry process.  
d) Recommendations:
Chapter VII of the Bill may be amended in order to provide for adequate protection to any person who may provide information that is additional or related to the wrongdoing that is disclosed by any whistleblower.


Safeguards: Public consultation on Rule‐making
a) Provision(s):  
Chapter VII Clauses 24, 25 and 26
b) Problem area:  
The  Bill  does  not  require  the  Central  and  State  Governments  to  make  Rules  after  prior publication  and  public  consultation.  Similarly  the  Competent  Authority  is  not  required  to make Regulations through the process of prior publication and consultation.
c) Rationale for improvement:
The  process  of  making  laws  and  subordinate  legislation  in  India  is  not  sufficiently participatory  and  consultative.  Even  though  the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897  contains  a procedure  for  making  rules  and  regulations  after  prior  publication  this  requirement  is  not
included  in  Bills.  As  a  result  Section  23  of  this  Act  remains  a  dead  letter,  rarely  used.
According to Section 4(1)(c) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 governments and public authorities  are  required  to  announce  all  facts  while  formulating  important  decisions  or announcing policies to inform the people. The Central Information Commission has on two separate occasions directed the Government of India and the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi to adopt consultative processes prior to tabling Bills and rules and regulations in Parliament and the State Legislature. It is only fitting that an important piece of  legislation,  such  as  the  Whistleblower  Bill,  contain  a  requirement  that  participatory procedures be adopted for making rules and regulations. Prior publication of draft rules and regulations ensures that people have an opportunity to give inputs to the process of making subordinate legislation. This ensures that the provisions in the principal Act are not diluted in the process of making subordinate legislation.
d) Recommendations:
• Clauses  24,  and  25  of  the  Bill  may  be  amended  to  require  the  Central  and  State Governments  to  make  rules  for  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  Bill  as  per  the procedure  of  prior  publication  described  in  Section  23  of  the  General  Clauses  Act, 1897.
• Clause  26  of  the  Bill  may  be  amended  to  require  the  Competent  Authority  to  make regulations  for  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  Bill  as  per  the  procedure  of  prior publication described in Section 23 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Posted by collective at February 14, 2011 10:24 PM