The battle for Muttur is apparently over. As the state media proclaims “Government in Full Control of Muttur.”

Ironically, the military offensive for Maavil Aru that commenced on July 31^st to open the sluice gates following the LTTE’s closing of the sluice gates and that spilled over into a battle for Muttur continues as the fighting does not seem to be over in Eastern Trincomalee. The LTTE announced that it would open the sluice gate as a humanitarian gesture but it is not yet clear whether the two sides are willing to step down from their military posturing and violence. While military analysts and their arm chair counterparts debate, extol and critique the success of both sides’ campaigns, the violence against the civilians during this last week of military and LTTE action has been presented as an unfortunate consequence, rather than the crime that it is.   

The military analysts’ version of the Battle for Muttur reads: on the 3^rd day of the battle for Mavil Aru the LTTE launched a counter offensive against Army Camps around the Muttur Area. More than 200 LTTE cadres reportedly infiltrated Muttur taking control of key sections of the town, including the police station. The two sides fired shells at each other’s positions with the Security forces maintaining an artillery barrage against the LTTE in Muttur Town and the surrounding areas including Sampur. Military propaganda from both sides declared that the town had been liberated, the strategic Muttur jetty was claimed by one side and then the other and with both sides blaming each other for shells that landed on civilian targets. Finally on the 5^th, 3 days after the battle began it seemingly ended, as the Government intensified its attacks and moved into secure control over the town and the LTTE made a strategic withdrawal from Muttur.

An alternate version of the Siege of Muttur reads: on August 2^nd as the LTTE laid siege to the town and the government attempted to push the LTTE back, shells begin to hit the town its residents flee to mosques, schools and churches. The maternity unit of the Muttur District Hospital was hit by a shell, injuring scores of people and forcing the hospital to shut down. Over the successive days, a number of shells hit civilian targets including the Arabic College on August 3^rd where civilians had sought shelter. 10 civilians were killed in the attack. The artillery barrage made civilian movement increasingly difficult, even to get basic supplies of food and water. The bodies of those killed could not be buried as their relatives and friends were too scared to step outside their shelters. The siege effectively shut off the town from humanitarian assistance, apart from a brief ceasefire to pull out some of the injured, and effectively trapped the residents within the town. On the second night of continuous shelling the Muslim civilians debated leaving en masse, on foot carrying a white flag. Eyewitness reports stated that a shell landed at approximately 6.20a.m. at the Arabic College the next morning as if to confirm that flight from Muttur was the only option. Over the next 24 hours thousands of Muthur’s residents fled south to Kantale.

Charges that need to be answered

While the urgency of the resulting humanitarian crisis demands immediate attention, the human rights abuses should not be ignored. There are some critical charges that need to be answered by the LTTE and the Government.

• The LTTE attempted to infiltrate and capture Muttur despite the fact that it is a concentrated urban settlement, effectively making the civilians human shields.
• Some eye witnesses allege that the LTTE fired mortars close to civilian shelters such as schools and religious institutions, Did the LTTE launch artillery attacks from areas close to these shelters knowing full well that the security forces would retaliate? If so, they were deliberately trying to cause civilian casualties.
• The Government and the LTTE blame each other for the shells that hit civilian targets but both sides failed to end the shelling. Did neither side know the layout of the town, particularly the location of buildings such as schools and religious institutions which are always places for refuge during times of conflict, and are recognized as such by international humanitarian law and norms of human decency? Who fired the shells on the Arabic College?
• The residents of Muttur demanded a ceasefire, even as a temporary measure, so as to allow humanitarian assistance and key actors such as the ICRC and the SLMM into the town but the two sides were not willing to guarantee their safety. The killing of 17 humanitarian workers from Action Contre La Faim in a brutal manner has to be investigated and the culprits brought to justice.
• Given the casualties and the damages to property the victims need to be compensated. Who will pay for it?      

In addition to violating basic international norms and conventions governing armed conflict, both sides demonstrated a fundamental disregard for civilian life. They expect not to be held responsible and to use the cover of war to hide these violations. A question we all have to ask is – “Is the argument of military necessity and the collateral damage that it necessitates enough to justify the level of human suffering it has caused?” If we do care for the future of our country as a multicultural country respective of justice and co-existence, we as concerned citizens need to demand that an impartial commission be established to investigate the violence in and around Muttur. It needs to be stated that there are a number of ongoing investigations: the killing of the five youth in Trincomalee in January 2006, the killing and burning of 4 people in Pesalai in December 2005. The victims are waiting for justice.   

‘Humanitarian Wars,’ Ethnic Cleansing and other Betrayals

The hysterical irony is that both sides insist they are fighting for humanitarian reasons. The suffering of one community is used to legitimize the brutalization of another, widening the cycle of violence and suffering. Taking the two sides’ justification at face value and given the present context with each side taking great pains to explain that they remain committed to the ceasefire, the government and the LTTE have fundamentally betrayed the civilians whom they both claim to protect.

For the Muslim Community of Muttur the battle has been a betrayal at multiple levels. The LTTE when it entered Muttur told the community that it was fighting on their behalf and assured their safety. When the Muslim Community took the decision to leave south to Kantale, the LTTE said it would provide safe passage and even drinking water. Between the 3^rd Mile Post and Pachanoor the LTTE cadres’ behaviour abruptly changed- they began to verbally and physically abuse the civilians and demanded that the men should separate from the women and youth under 15. A masked man identified individuals from among the crowd, who were accused of being members of Jihad, and they were tied up by the LTTE. There are conflicting reports as to what happened next, with some stating that the LTTE began firing at the men. A shell landed in the vicinity reportedly killing some of the LTTE cadres and the fleeing Muslims. It is still unclear as to how many of the men were abducted by the LTTE, with rough estimates ranging from 30 to 60 and how many were killed in the explosion or shot by the LTTE.      

For the Muslim Communities of Muttur and across the North East the LTTE’s targeting of Muttur and the incident near Pachanoor have challenged the limited trust they have of the LTTE. Besides violating basic norms of international humanitarian law enshrined in the Geneva Convention, the LTTE’s action especially at Pachanoor suggests that the guarantees it provides are meaningless. The Siege of Muttur has been presented by some as a continuation of its policy of ethnic cleansing. The precedent of the expulsion of the Northern Muslims who were forcibly expelled by the LTTE in 1990 and are still living in displacement is a stark reminder of the LTTE’s approach to the ‘Muslim problem.’ On May 29^th this year, notices appeared in Muttur demanding that the Muslims leave within 72 hours. While the LTTE denied sending the notice, it failed to condemn it, raising suspicions of its underlying intentions. From this perspective, Muttur is a confirmation of the LTTE’s overall strategy of creating a mono-ethnic Tamil Eelam, with the Muslims of the East facing the same fate as that of their Northern Counterparts. That the Muttur Community was forced into displacement has sent ripples of fear across the East Coast Muslims as the Muthur Muslims was perceived to be a community that had created some sort of modus vivendi with the LTTE. Their safe return is thus a serious concern for all these other Muslim communities, not least for the Muttur Muslims who are presently living in the most pathetic situation. 

That a Tamil-Muslim understanding needs to be forged at a political and social level for a final peace to be realized, especially in the East, is well recognized. Yet, over this peace process the LTTE has not responded in a consistent and adequate manner to address the basic fears of the Muslim Community. The LTTE has seamlessly shifted from confidence building measures to harassment and human rights abuses; local LTTE leaders and cadres are given the freedom to carry out repressive policies in contravention of guarantees given by the LTTE leader while the LTTE leadership speaks of assurances and mutual coexistence.

The Government too has betrayed the Muslim Community. Like the residents of Kebetigollewa the people of Muttur are also asking where were the armed forces and the police that was meant to protect them. Muslims are reminded of other instances of state inaction as during the Valaichennai Communal violence of April 2003 when the armed forces stood by and watched as the bodies of Muslims killed in the violence were burnt in front of them. The Northern Muslim Expulsion of 1990 did not take place in just LTTE-controlled areas but also in Government held areas such as Mannar Island where the armed forces were not willing to provide security assurances to the communities there.

During the siege, the Muslims of Muttur appealed directly to the President through Muslim political leaders to stop the artillery barrage but to no avail. A question that arises is – Would the Government have adopted such an approach if it was a Sinhala Community that was taken hostage? Instead, Muslims are forced to deal with the reality that they will be the target of both sides. In the violence in Trincomalee during Sinhala and Tamil New Year this year, Muslim shops were burned along with Tamil shops by Sinhalese mobs and Muslims were among those killed in the aerial bombardment of Sampur following the LTTE’s attempted assassination of Army Commander Sarath Fonseka.  

The government response to the humanitarian crisis has also raised serious fears within the Muslim Community. Besides not taking measures to ensure humanitarian relief during the siege, the response to the mass exodus has been problematic at multiple levels. It was Muslim relief agencies and civil society groups that rushed in to provide immediate relief, while the INGOs and Government agencies with their disaster preparedness manuals seem to have missed the glaring fact that there were more than 40,000 people who needed urgent relief for at least three days before the exodus took place. As seen with the tsunami disaster, Government is increasingly divesting itself of implementation duties relating to relief. While the Government is engaging in ration distribution and facilitating humanitarian work, it is international agencies who are expected to fund and implement a significant amount of the work, who in turn ignore much of the early response of local agencies and communities. While efforts are being made to address this large scale crisis, the situation is still desperate – people sleeping under trees and by the roadside, 5 toilets for more than 4,000 people in one welfare camp, the list goes on. This situation needs to be addressed immediately but the needs of other displaced and affected communities in the North East should also be taken up.

The Government is sensitive to the concerns of the Sinhala Community of Kantale who are afraid that the displaced could become a semi-permanent population. It is keen to shift the Muslims to Kinniya, so that they can be among their own kind. Reports of two Muslim displaced killed in Kantale by an unknown group makes clear the security threats they continue to face. The state needs to provide the displaced of all communities security and mediate between local host communities and the displaced. The violence in Muttur and Thopur seem to be continuing with reports filtering of civilians still facing the threat of shells and bullets. Creating conditions for the return of Muttur’s Muslims is also an urgent requirement, especially providing security. An immediate ceasefire needs to be negotiated to end the fighting and cannot be further delayed. The onus is on both parties to end the killings now.       

Muttur is a stark example of the security and political dilemma of the Muslim Community in the North East. On one hand they have to face the LTTE that has an ambivalent, at best, policy towards them that wildly oscillates between engagement and brutality. These policies ignore and subvert the history of Tamil-Muslim coexistence and the reality of mutual dependency of the Muslim and Tamil Communities. On the other the Muslims have to deal with a state as citizens who are meant to be provided protection but are left helpless during times of crisis. The response to this dilemma does not have one answer. Ensuring Muslim concerns are addressed at peace talks is essential and a separate Muslim delegation is just one. Nevertheless, it a critical step in that direction.

Mirak Raheem is a researcher at the Centre for Policy Alternatives.