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October 27, 2008
Progressive Thought in Islam

Yogi Sikand's translation of a chapter from Maulana Wahiduddin Khan's book titled Din-o-Shariat: Din-e Islam Ka Ek Fikri Muta'ala [Goodword Books, New Delhi, 2003, pp.214-224] presents the need for introspection, analysis and forward thinking within the Muslim intelligentsia and the community at large. 

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Human minds can be categorised into two types: taqlidi (stagnant and imitative of past precedent) and ijtihadi (dynamic and creative). The former denotes closed mindedness; the latter is its opposite, open mindedness. The taqlidi mind attains a certain level and then stagnates, while the ijtihadi mind keeps travelling ahead, stopping only at death.

The difference between the taqlidi and the ijtihadi mindsets can be illustrated with the help of an example. Shakespeare was a famous English writer, and so was George Bernard Shaw, who was born some two hundred and fifty years after the former's death. Shaw's contribution to English literature was less than that of Shakespeare, and he himself admitted this when he said, 'I am smaller in stature than Shakespeare, but I stand upon his shoulders'. This is an example of an ijtihadi way of thinking, and a society characterised by such persons constantly progresses in terms of thought and intellect. Each new generation in such a society builds on the contributions of its predecessors, adds to it and then transmits its legacy to the generations that come after it.

 

But contemporary Muslim societies present a completely different picture. In modern times, their intellectual development has almost come to a halt. This is because they have developed a taqlidi, as opposed to ijtihadi, way of thinking, and consider ijtihad to be almost a sin. Many Muslims mistakenly believe that in terms of religious perspectives, the ulema of the past have accomplished all that there was to, and that today our task is simply to study the books that they wrote and strictly follow them.

 

This approach is a major hurdle in the path of our intellectual progress. In this regard, Muslims can adopt one of two positions: to recognise, like Shaw did with regard to Shakespeare, that their stature might be less than that of the ulema of the past, but that, despite this, they are standing on the latter's shoulders; or to believe that because their stature is less than that of the ulema of the past, they must remain forever at the latter's feet.

 

The first of these two approaches represents an ijtihadi way of thinking, one conducive to constant intellectual development. In a society characterised by such an approach, each new generation fully respecst those that went before it and, building, on the contributions of its predecessors, makes even more progress. In contrast, the second approach represents a taqlidi way of thinking, which keeps Muslim thought stagnant, preventing it from moving in the direction of constantly progressing stages of knowledge and understanding that Islam stands for. It also causes Muslims to fall behind other communities in the intellectual field, killing their intellectual faculties.

Let me elaborate on this point with the help of some Hadith reports.

 

Respect for Humanity

 

Several narrators of Hadith have recorded that once, in Madinah, when a procession carrying a dead body for burial passed by the Prophet, he stood up on seeing it out of respect. His companions who were with him did the same. When it was pointed out to him that the deceased was a Jew, the Prophet simply remarked that the man was a human being.

 

This incident is included in his collection of Hadith by Imam Bukhari, who made an immense contribution to Hadith studies by collecting over 7000 reports that he considered authentic from several hundred thousand reports that had been attributed to the Prophet. He mentioned this hadith in the chapter on burial in his Sahih Bukhari. Now, if we were to adopt a taqlidi approach and consider this hadith simply as something related to burial, and not something more than just that, we will not be able to learn anything new from this hadith. We would simply parrot what the earlier commentators on Hadith have said about it, without being able to derive anything new from it. And while we respect the intellectual contributions of the earlier exegetes of Hadith, we cannot accept all that they have written as gospel truth. Many ulema of the past have commented on this hadith report, offering various theories for the Prophet's action, with some claiming that this practice [of standing up when the corpse of a non-Muslim passed by] was later abrogated, or that the Prophet did so because he did not want the corpse of a Jew to be at a level higher than that of his head, and so on. Now, all these explanations are based on personal speculation and lack adequate proof. This hadith narrative very clearly indicates that the Prophet stood up out of respect for the dead man [and not because of any of the reasons that these Hadith commentators had suggested]. In other words, this hadith is not simply about burial, as those with a taqlidi mindset would imagine. Rather, it is a fine example of respect for humankind, irrespective of religion, as those with an ijtihadi mindset might be able to discover. It could be offered as a counter to those who claim that while Islam preaches respect for fellow Muslims, it does not do so with regard to people of other faiths. This hadith, if approached in an ijtihadi way, can be presented as evidence of the Islamic principle that all human beings are worthy of respect, no matter what their religion or community.

 

On the other hand, if this hadith is approached in a taqlidi fashion and is interpreted in the same way as those traditionalist commentators we have referred to have done, this Islamic principle will be completely occluded.

 

Consideration for Context

 

According to a report also contained in the Sahih Bukhari, the Prophet told his wife Hazrat Ayesha that when the Qureish rebuilt the Kaaba they did not do so on its original foundation as set by the Prophet Abraham, but, rather, had changed it. Hearing this, Hazrat Ayesha asked the Prophet why he could not restructure the Kaaba on its original foundation. To this the Prophet replied that the Qureish had only recently renounced infidelity for Islam, and it was possible that if he were to do so, it might cause them to agitate. He added that had there been no danger of this happening he would certainly have done what Hazrat Ayesha had suggested.

 

Imam Bukhari has included this hadith in his chapter on Haj. Now, if we were to consider the hadith simply in this way, reflecting a taqlidi approach, all that we would gain from it would be some information about the glories of Mecca. If, on the other hand, we adopt an ijtihadi approach to view this hadith we can gain a new understanding of what can be called the wisdom of practical living. To leave the Kaaba on the foundations laid by the Qureish, instead of reconstructing it on the foundation laid by the Prophet Abraham, might appear to have been incorrect. But, despite this, the Prophet chose not to reconstruct it in the latter way because in the given circumstances this would have posed additional problems.

 

From this practice of the Prophet we can derive the principle that in life when sometimes faced with certain challenges, for the moment we should look not at what is right and what is wrong, but, instead, at what is possible and what is not.

Abiding by this principle is a key to succeeding in this world. In today's world, many of the failures of Muslims have been because they have not abided by this principle. They did not look at problems or challenges from the point of view of what is possible and what is not, but, rather, considered them only from the perspective of what is right and what is not. Accordingly, they rushed into action hoping to attain what they thought was ideal, although, in the given circumstances, achieving this was not actually possible. Many of the sacrifices that Muslims in modern times have made but that have not borne any fruits have been a result of abandoning this principle that this hadith refers to. In turn, the major cause of this attitude is the taqlidi mind-set.

 

Gradualism in Establishing Islamic Commandments

 

According to another hadith report in the Sahih Bukhari, Hazrat Ayesha once mentioned that  many of the earliest chapters of the Quran to be revealed dealt with the subject of heaven and hell and that only after people's faith in Islam had become strong were verses dealing with issues that are permissible (halal) and forbidden (haram) sent down. She added that had the commandments forbidding the consumption of alcohol and adultery been revealed in the beginning, instead of later, people would have refused to obey them.

Imam Bukhari has included this hadith in his chapter on the compilation of the Quran. Now if we were to view this hadith simply from the point of view of it being related to the compilation of the Quran, in accordance with a taqlidi perspective, we would not be able to derive any other knowledge from it. On the other hand, by engaging in ijtihad and reflecting on the wider implications of this hadith, going beyond its relation to the question of the compilation of the Quran, we can discover that this hadith suggests a very important Islamic principle—that with regard to the enforcement or establishment of the rules of the shariah a certain wisdom is required. It must be a gradual process, as it was in early Islamic times. Accordingly, at first peoples' faith was made firm so that they would be receptive to obeying Divine commands, and only after that were various laws introduced.

 

If the approach of present-day Islamic leaders is examined from this way of understanding this particular hadith, it appears that they have failed to appreciate the underlying broader implications of this hadith as regards the process of establishing Islamic laws in society. In many Muslim countries today, numerous movements and groups are clamouring for the enforcement of the shariah, but despite their many sacrifices this has not happened, in the true sense of the term, anywhere. This is because the faith of the Muslims has weakened, and their intellectual and emotional commitment has declined, and this means that many of them are no longer willing to accept shariah laws. Despite their fervent attempts to enforce shariah laws, these Muslim leaders lacked the necessary ijtihadi approach and insight. They rushed into the political realm armed with their taqlidi baggage, and thus failed to achieve their objectives. They sought to impose shariah laws on society without first seeking to prepare society to willingly accept them, in contrast to what this hadith suggests is the right way.

 

Change in Field of Activity

 

According to another hadith report contained in the Sahih Bukhari, the Prophet is said to have remarked that he had been instructed to proceed to another town, Madinah, which people referred to as Yathrib. Imam Bukhari has included this hadith in his chapter on the glories of Madinah. Now, those with a taqlidi approach will view this hadith as providing information simply about the glories of Madinah, and indeed this is what most exegetes of Hadith in the past have done. Some have even seen this hadith as indicating that to refer to Madinah as Yathrib is disapproved of (makruh).  However, the Quran itself refers to Madinah as Yathrib, and so this explanation of this hadith is incorrect. But, if one goes beyond the blind imitation of the past exegetes and ponders on this hadith from an ijtihadi perspective, one learns that it speaks about a very important Islamic principle—that of changing one's field or arena of action. This hadith indicates that when conditions became extremely severe and harsh for Muslims in Mecca, Allah commanded the Prophet to shift from there to another town, Yathrib, where he and his followers would find a more conducive atmosphere, so much so that it would become a centre of Islam and people would start referring to it as the 'City of the Prophet' or Madinat al-Rasul or the 'City of Islam' or Madinat al-Islam.

 

Now, this principle of shifting one's arena of activity if conditions so demand, which this hadith refers to, is important for success in various matters. It indicates that if in a certain place conditions are inappropriate one should shift to another place, or that if conflict would prove useless, one should seek to achieve one's objectives through peaceful dialogue. Unfortunately, today's Muslim leaders, burdened by their taqlidi mentality, have not been able to appreciate and act on this wisdom, because of which they have themselves faced considerable damage and loss. For instance, in several countries today, violent movements are engaged in conflict in the name of Islam, which have resulted in Muslims having to suffer massive loss of life and property. Because of their taqlidi approach, the leaders of these movements have been unable to appreciate the underlying message of this hadith of the Prophet. They would have been able understand the import of this hadith if they had an ijithadi approach. In that case, and in accordance with the principle enunciated by this hadith, they would have abandoned the path of conflict and adopted peaceful means instead. Then, in accordance with the law of nature, they would have succeeded.

 

From these above-mentioned examples I have sought to clarify the distinction between the taqlidi and ijtihadi approaches. The former stops at the initial stage and refuses to move ahead. In contrast, the latter proceeds through all the stages, seeking to reach the end. The first step is the end in itself for those who abide by taqlid, but for those inspired by and committed to ijtihad, it is a means, a path to the higher stages.

 

Stages of Studying the Hadith

 

The early scholars of Hadith made an immense contribution by collecting and compiling a vast number of hadith reports. This could be described as the first stage in the study of Hadith. In what could be called the second stage, the next generation of Hadith scholars prepared indices of Hadith in order to make the subject easier to understand. In the third stage of the development of the study of Hadith, the Companions of the Prophet and the two generations that succeeded them edited and compiled the commentaries on Hadith, thus preparing the necessary background material for a proper understanding of Hadith.

The fourth stage in the study of Hadith entails studying hadith reports in their particular temporal context in order to appreciate their broader meaning and implications. I have sought to do this with regard to selected hadith reports that I have dealt with above. The fifth stage in the study of Hadith could be to prepare an extensive encyclopaedia of all genuine hadith reports so as to enable people to properly understand them in a style with which they are familiar. Of course, these stages in the study of Hadith that I have suggested are not categorical or final. Rather, these are offered simply for purposes of indicating the differences between a taqlidi and an ijtihadi way of understanding, and to point out the benefits of the latter. 

 

The Need For Reviving Ijtihad Today

 

Ijtihad is not a mere intellectual exercise. Rather, it is an extremely important and basic requirement for the followers of Islam. Through ijtihad Muslims have been able to re-establish their religious status in every age. Through ijithad they have also been able to engage in tatbiq (reconstructing and reapplying the principles of Islam in accordance with the Quran and Hadith) in the context of changing social contexts and conditions, thereby proving that Islam is a religion for all time and that it is as relevant for the future as it was in the past. In other words, ijtihad is a means to constantly update Islamic thought and to thereby maintain its relevance.

 

What is Ijtihad?

 

Ijithad does not mean making decisions or coming to conclusions based on free will. Rather, it denotes reflecting on the primary sources of Islam—the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet—and through deduction (istinbat) or analogy (qiyas) to suggest rules for new issues and problems. In actual fact, ijtihad is also a form of taqlid. Ordinary muqallids do taqlid of the learned jurisprudents (fuqaha), while a mujtahid, one who engages in ijtihad, does taqlid of God and the Prophet. Examining the Quran and Hadith directly, he deduces rules and guidelines from these sources for issues not explicitly mentioned therein.

 

By ijtihad is meant precisely that intellectual activity which is termed istinbat in the Quran (al-Nisa: 83). In the language of the fuqaha it is termed as qiyas. This is to say that ijtihad is to deduce the rules as regards issues that are not explicitly mentioned in the Quran and Hadith. The term istinbat comes from the root nabt, which means 'to draw out water from below the ground'. Thus, the term istinbat al-fiqhiyya means that a faqih or Islamic jurisprudent has closely studied the Quran and Hadith and has revealed its hidden

meaning. The noted Quranic commentator al-Qurtabi writes that istinbat is the same as istikhraj or 'deduction' which is engaged in to derive the shariah ruling with regard to a particular matter when neither the divine sources of the faith (nass) nor the consensus of the ulema (ijma) have explicitly pronounced on this issue.

 

This is the sort of work that the fuqaha of the second [Islamic] century engaged in. Many new issues emerged during the Abbasid period, for which answers were not directly or explicitly mentioned in the Quran and the Sunnah. At this time, the fuqaha engaged in ijtihad to come up with answers to these questions, deriving these through deduction and analogy from the Quran and Sunnah. In this way, Muslims were able to acquire guidance from the shariah in the new contexts that they were faced with.

 

However, things began to change after the second or third [Islamic] century, and, due to certain reasons, a wrong impression took root that whatever deduction or ijtihad directly from the Quran and Sunnah had to be made had already been fully completed by the earlier fuqaha, and that, henceforth, there was no need for this process to be carried further. It thus came to be believed that later generations of Muslims had to simply study the books of these earlier fuqaha and from these texts find shariah rules for new issues. In this way, the fuqaha of the Abbasid period were granted the status of mujtahid-e mutlaq

('absolute mujtahid') and those of later periods only that of mujtahid-e muqayyad ('limited mujtahid'). The ijtihad of the fuqaha of the earlier period was based on the Quran and the Sunnah but for the later fuqaha it was considered to be restricted within the framework and boundaries set by the views and the writings of the former, within which they were expected to engage in seeking to explicating shariah instructions.

 

Intellectual Dilemma

 

This is the starting point for the Muslims' intellectual dilemma. This misconception about ijtihad caused Muslim thought to stagnate. It rendered ijtihad extremely narrow and confined, leading to Muslim backwardness. Ijtihad is not something that can be chosen or rejected. Rather, it is an indispensable and natural activity. Thus, to stop ijtihad is to seek to stop the progress of nature, and those who seek to do this cause the end of their own progress. The life of a river lies in its flow. If the waters of a river are blocked, it will no longer remain a river. Rather, it will turn into a stagnant pool. Likewise, if a community tries to stop ijtihad it will completely stagnate and will fail to progress in material, religious and spiritual terms.

 

The Capacity to Reassess

 

A muqallid, being a blind follower of past juridical views, remains stuck in his own groove, and is unable to reassess or re-think any issues on his own. He walks on only one familiar path, even if this leads him nowhere. In contrast, a person characterized by an ijtihadi mindset constantly examines issues, past and present, and, accordingly, charts his path. The taqlidi mind is stuck in the past, while the ijtihadi mind is geared to the future.

 

A good illustration of this is provided in Indian history. When, from the late eighteenth century onwards, India came under British control,bMuslim leaders had, by and large, only one aim in mind: to militarily fight the British. Their minds were moulded by the old perceptions of war and conflict and the notion of dar ul-harb ('abode of war'), and that is why they could only think of fighting the British and to destroy them. It was this perception that led Tipu Sultan into battle with British forces in 1799, the outcome of which was that he himself was killed in the battlefield and his vast empire came to an abrupt and violent end. It was the same vision that was behind the launching of a violent uprising against the British by Muslim leaders in 1857. Similar uprisings occurred even after that throughout the nineteenth century. The outcome of these violent movements, too, was the same: widespread loss and destruction that Muslims had to suffer. No benefit accrued from these to Islam or to Muslims.

 

This was the case with those people who, in the matter concerning the British, adopted a taqlidi approach. At the same time, history affords us with an example of a Muslim leader who adopted an ijtihadi approach on the same matter and in the same period. This person was the renowned Egyptian Islamic scholar, Syed Muhammad Rashid Riza (d.1935). He visited Lucknow in 1912 at the invitation of Maulana Shibli Numani to attend a convention at the Dar ul-Ulum Nadwat ul-Ulema. After that, he went to the Dar ul-Ulum at Deoband, which, at that time, was, in a sense, the centre of an anti-British Muslim movement. A special function was organized there for him, and in his address he said:

'[One] aspect of the spread of Islam has to do with non-Muslims. There are numerous different sorts of idol worshippers in India, people who worship trees, the moon, the sun, the stars and even those who worship bad things. If Muslims had a set of committed missionaries they could tell these people about Islam, and we could gain considerably more success than Christian missionaries. In addition, every far-sighted Muslim must note that Muslims are much less in number than non-Muslims in this country, which makes them a vulnerable minority. The British Government, which is based on reason and justice, has established a balance between non-Muslims and Muslims. If, God forbid, this balance should ever be destroyed, the Indian Muslims might even face the same fate as that of their co-religionists in Spain. That is why there must be among us a group whose task it should be to combat misconceptions about Islam that now abound. This is really very essential. But this is not possible without knowledge of modern philosophy. Hence, this group of Islamic missionaries must be familiar with the issues and concerns of modern philosophy'.

 

This speech of Syed Muhammad Rashid Riza is an example of ijtihadi insight. On closely examining the then prevailing conditions he well understood that the balance in pre-Partition India between Muslims and the non-Muslim majority was because of the existence of a third party—the British. He also knew that when this third party withdrew, the balance would be suddenly destroyed, after which the situation for Muslims would be totally transformed, and that political independence would create new problems for them, rather than ending their problems.

 

On the basis of this insight, Sayyed Rashid Riza advised Indian Muslim leaders to be active in the field of dawah or inviting others to the faith of Islam, rather that engaging in war and conflict. Instead of making preparations for war, they should, he suggested, make intellectual preparations so that they could effectively engage in missionary work in accordance with the needs of the times. However, the then Muslim leaders were so deeply drowned in anti-British hatred that they could not even imagine that it would be possible for them to engage in any sort of constructive work as long as the British remained in India. And so, a great historical opportunity was lost, and the only reason for this was the lack of ijtihadi insight.

 

This is just one example of how, because of the lack of ijtihad and continued adherence to taqlid, Muslims have had to undergo much unnecessary suffering and damage, causing them to stagnate.

 

The Development of Fiqh in the Period of Muslim Political Dominance

 

Our [Sunni] corpus of fiqh was compiled mainly in the Abbasid period, which was a time when Muslims were the most powerful political force in the world. Naturally, therefore, this fiqh was influenced by the mentality of this age of Muslim political domination. Because of this, it turned into a sort of what can be called jurisprudence of dominance.

 

I once happened to listen to a speech by a famous Islamic scholar. The title of his lecture was 'Islam in the Modern Age'. At the end of the lecture, a man from the audience asked the scholar what he felt was the guidance that the shariah provided in relation to a country like India. The scholar stood silent for a while, and then answered that it was very difficult to respond to this question. The reason, he said, was that the Islamic shariah presented a model based on Muslim political dominance but had no such model based on a position of modesty [or lack of Muslim political domination].

 

For a long time the question kept turning in my mind as to why this scholar had not found a model based on a position of modesty for Muslims. Finally, I discovered that this scholar, like many other contemporary Muslim leaders, erroneously viewed the corpus of medieval fiqh as synonymous with the Islamic shariah. This fiqh was developed at the time when Muslims were a dominant political power, and so, whether consciously or otherwise, it had turned into a fiqh of the political dominant. It thus represented the condition of Muslim political power and domination. This is why when, in the modern period, Muslims lost political power they felt that the shariah was unable to provide them with proper guidance. And, because of this, they assumed that their main task should be to again acquire political power, for which they felt the need to unleash wars against others.

 

It is true that the corpus of fiqh which was developed in the period of Muslim political domination did not provide appropriate guidance for Muslims living in a position of modesty, or lack of political domination, but, undoubtedly, the Quran does provide this sort of guidance. After all, the Quran provides guidance for all conditions and contexts, including where Muslims are not a politically dominant community. God knew that Muslims shall not always enjoy the same position forever, but, instead, would be faced with different situations, including being politically dominant as well as being bereft of political power. Even the Prophet Muhammad faced both these situations. In the period of his prophethood in Makkah, the Muslims were in a position of modesty, lacking political domination, while the period in Madinah was one of political power. Both periods of the Prophet's life provide Muslims with appropriate models to emulate. Neither of these two models is superior or inferior to the other. God judges all actions according to their intentions, not according to external conditions including political or non-political conditions.

 

The Case of the Vilification of the Prophet

 

To understand this issue, consider the case of the issue of the vilification of the Prophet. The fuqaha are almost entirely unanimous in claiming that the punishment for vilification of the Prophet, even if it is only through indirect indication, is death. Only very few fuqaha have opined otherwise. And even today, Muslim scholars quote this opinion of the fuqaha in their writings. Now, the question arises that if the shariah indeed lays down death for vilifying the Prophet, then why is it that this was not the punishment ordered for this crime in the early Islamic period?

 

Early Islamic history provides numerous instances of people who vilified the Prophet but yet were not killed for this. A striking example in this regard is that of Abdullah bin Abi Ibn Sulul of Madinah, who used to openly vilify the Prophet. Yet, and despite the insistence of his followers, the Prophet did not order that he should be killed. Instead, he died a natural death.

 

What was the reason for not ordering that he be killed? Allamah Ibn Taimiyyah says that this was because the Prophet felt that if this man had been ordered to be slain people would have got repelled by Islam, because Islam was then in a 'weak' (zaif) position.

 

In this regard, we should raise the question as to why there is this difference between the fiqh of the early Islamic period and that which developed in the Abbasid age. To further explore this issue, consider the fatwa delivered by Ayatollah Khoemini of Iran in February 1989, opining that because Salman Rushdie had vilified the Prophet in his book 'Satanic Verses', it was obligatory on the part of Muslims to kill him. When this fatwa was issued I was one of the very few Muslims who did not agree with it. Muslims organized massive demonstrations in many countries in support of the fatwa, but, despite this, Salman Rushdie could not be killed. And, furthermore, the fatwa and the massive Muslim support for it gave Islam a bad name the world over, creating the wrong image of Islam as a barbaric religion.

 

In today's world, many people consider freedom of opinion to be human beings' most important right, and, for some people, it is in fact a substitute for religion. That is why many people saw the fatwa as an assault on their religion or freedom, and so came out in full support of Rushdie. The global media also passionately defended him and spread the news throughout the world. And so it came to be that the apprehension because of which the Prophet restrained from ordering the death of Abdullah bin Abi came true—and a thousand times more intensely—as a result of the fatwa against Rushdie.

 

Carefully examine these two opposite positions. The Prophet's action indicates that in matters concerning vilification of the Prophet, no matter how severe it may be, the practical consequences of ordering the death of the criminal must be considered. If the followers of Islam do not have the sort of control on the situation to prevent the negative consequences of slaying the criminal they should not inflict this punishment on him. Rather, they should leave the matter to God. But the opinion of the fuqaha is the opposite—that any and every person who vilifies the Prophet must be immediately killed.

 

In this context, the question must be asked as to why in this matter Muslims did not take guidance from the example of the Prophet, but, instead, adhered to the contrary opinion of the fuqaha, and, in doing so, demanded the death penalty for Rushdie. The answer to this question is that Muslims today continue to be wedded to the notion of taqlid. They now believe that the doors of ijtihad directly from the Quran and Sunnah have been shut, and that they can only engage in very limited ijtihad—ijithad-e muqayyad. In other words, they have been wrongly led to believe that Muslims can no longer derive answers to issues directly from the Quran and Sunnah. They now believe that all they can do is to study the fatwas of the past fuqaha and blindly imitate them. And that is why they adopted that particular stance in the Rushdie affair.

 

As I mentioned above, the present-day corpus of fiqh was compiled in a period when Muslims enjoyed political dominance. At that time, Muslims were in a position to effectively put down any signs of revolt. But today the conditions have changed. No longer do Muslims have the same sort of political control. Moreover, they are also faced with a number of unfavourable conditions. For instance, the belief that freedom of expression has no limits, that it is the be all and the end all of everything, and the emergence of mass media forever on the look-out for what it considers as 'hot news'. It was because of these new conditions that despite the massive Muslim agitation, it was not possible to kill Rushdie. And, furthermore, as I mentioned earlier, the Muslim response led to Islam getting a bad name throughout the world, and many non-Muslims were led to believe that Islam is a barbaric religion that stirs up fanaticism among its followers. This was the result of seeking to follow and impose a fiqh prescription devised in the age of Muslim political conditions in today's very different and changed context.

 

If with regard to the Rushdie case Muslims had adopted the method of ijtihad-e mutlaq or absolute ijtihad and, accordingly, had sought guidance directly from the Quran and Sunnah, instead of engaging in taqlid of the past fuqaha, they would have realized that the right solution to the controversy was not to issue a fatwa calling for Rushdie's death, but, rather, to abstain from any violent reaction and, instead, to engage in peaceful dawah work to explain the truth to the people about Islam and the Prophet. But because they remain stuck in the morass of the fiqh which had been developed in the period of Muslim political dominance, they could only consider the solution that was developed by the fuqaha of that period—death penalty for vilification of the Prophet. And that, in turn, led to Islam wrongly getting a bad name the world over.

 

Taqlid, Ijtihad and Democracy

 

In the wake of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, Western countries established their political and cultural domination over much of the rest of the world, leading to the establishment of European colonial empires. This posed a new and major challenge for Muslims. At that time, numerous Muslim leaders in various countries emerged, inspired with just one mission—to engage in armed jihad—thinking that to be the only solution to the challenge of Western imperialism. But despite two hundred years of armed struggle against the West, Muslims did not gain substantially. 

 

If this problem is examined in the light of the Quran and Hadith it is clear that the solution lay somewhere else—in peaceful dawah or missionary work. The Prophet was faced with a similar predicament, and the Quran's instruction to him in this context was to present the message of God to the people, for this would be the guarantee of his protection (Surah Al-Maidah: 67). The Quran advises us to engage in dawah and propagation of Islam with wisdom (hikmat), and it adds that the result of this would be that one's foes would become one's friends. Thus, it declares, 'And O Prophet, goodness and evil are not equal. Repel evil with what is best. You will see that he with whom you had enmity has become your closest friend' (Surah Fussilat: 34).

 

It would not be wrong to say that the Quran indicates that dawah is the only solution. Why is it, then, that modern-day Muslims could not understand this? Why did they take to jihad, in the sense of physical warfare or qital, instead of dawah, especially when it was not difficult to realize that in the given conditions violence would cause even more destruction for Muslims and nothing else? Why is it that modern-day Muslim leaders made such a terrible blunder by adopting the slogan that violent jihad was the only solution?

 

In my opinion, one of the main reasons for this was that these leaders considered that ijtihad-e mutlaq or directly deriving rules from the Quran and Hadith to be prohibited for them. In accordance with their deeply-rooted taqlidi mentality, they believed that they had to strictly follow the guidance and rules of the established corpus of fiqh. Now these books of fiqh were full of rules and commandments about jihad, in the sense of qital. In contrast, they hardly contained any rules that could provide guidance for the task of dawah. They had long and detailed chapters on jihad, in the sense of qital, but none at all on dawah and tabligh.

 

These leaders could have learnt about the need to engage in dawah in the Quran, but they viewed the Quran simply as a book of laws. For rules for new issues they turned not to the Quran, but, instead, to the established corpus of fiqh, which, as I said, does not contain any guidance for dawah work. From this it can be gauged how useful and essential ijtihad, in the sense of directly deriving rules from the Quran and Hadith, is, and, contrarily, how harmful taqlid, regarding the established corpus of fiqh as the sole source of rules, can be.

 

This same mistake was made by many Indian Muslim leaders who, in the wake of the establishment of British rule, declared India to be dar ul-harb or 'abode of war'. In 1823 Shah Abdul Aziz issued a fatwa, opining that India had now turned into dar ul-harb. Thereafter, 500 Indian ulema signed a fatwa claiming that it had now become obligatory for the Indian Muslims to engage in jihad, in the sense of qital, against the British. Consequently, many Muslims began being involved in violent anti-British activities, thinking this to be their religious duty. This carried on for over a hundred years but it proved to be completely fruitless. Despite this, it is shocking to see how some Muslims still believe, and some even openly announce, that India is dar ul-harb and that they can solve their problems through jihad.

 

The reason for this peculiar situation is that the minds of these people are still stuck in the groove of the traditional corpus of fiqh based on the established maslaks, or schools of thought, whose views on taqlid and ijtihad they consider themselves duty bound to follow. And according to this tradition of fiqh, countries like India are categorized as dar ul-harb. Had these Muslim leaders gone back even before the formation of the schools of fiqh, directly to the Quran and Sunnah, they would undoubtedly have realized that the status of a country like India is not that of dar ul-harb, but, rather, that of dar ul-dawah, 'abode of missionary work' by inviting others to the faith. But this they did not do because they considered ijtihad, in the sense of directly approaching the Quran and Sunnah to derive rules, to be prohibited to them. In accordance with their taqlidi approach, they limited themselves wholly to the corpus of established fiqh for guidance. And, as is known, this corpus of fiqh speaks in detail about dar ul-harb but not at all about dar ul-dawah.

 

Present-Day Fiqh Is Not Enough

 

The present corpus of fiqh was compiled by the second or third [Islamic] centuries. Many Muslims erroneously believe that this fiqh is complete and that it contains all the teachings of the Quran and Hadith related to human life. This reflects the belief that, following the compilation of this corpus of fiqh, the doors of ijtihad-e mutlaq or 'absolute ijtihad' were fully closed, and that now only ijtihad-e muqayyad or ijtihad within the established schools of fiqh or what can be called taqlidi ijtihad, is permissible.

 

This belief might have been seen as appropriate in the past, but when social conditions began to undergo massive changes with the passing of the traditional age and the advent of modern science, it proved to be extremely harmful for Muslims. Muslims had come to view the corpus of fiqh as a complete legal system, and believed that there was no need to look beyond it for solutions to all their problems. Because of this, modern-day Muslims were unable to access guidance on numerous issues which was present in the Quran and Sunnah but not in the   established  corpus of fiqh.

 

Let me cite one instance in this regard. The political revolutions that accompanied the advent of the modern age brought about democracy as a new political system. Our corpus of fiqh had been developed in a prior age, that of monarchy. That is why it had no conception of modern democracy.  Consequently, Muslims who thought in terms of the established corpus of fiqh could not appreciate or understand the importance of democracy. That is why some of them branded it as irreligious (la-dini) and even as 'prohibited' (haram). Others denounced it as a system of counting heads, where numbers are given the importance that quality deserves.

 

But, in fact, democracy has the potential of being a blessing for Muslims. In contrast to the old monarchical system, democracy is based on the principle of power-sharing.  It offers Muslims the opportunity to gain political importance if they act wisely. But because of the lack of ijtihadi insight Muslims failed to do so. Instead, their taqlidi approach led them to talk about such plans as launching a movement to establish the Caliphate in America and to change the name of California to Caliph-ornia and dreaming up similar laughable schemes. But they failed to see how by participating in democratic governance and getting involved in democratic processes they might be able to make a place for themselves in democratic countries.

 

The reason for this terrible backwardness of present-day Muslim thought is the refusal to engage in ijtihad, to come out of the boundaries of the established corpus of fiqh and to gain guidance directly from the Quran and Hadith. But for this Muslims would have been able to ponder on the Quran, and this would have taught them that the Quran provides appropriate guidance in this regard.

 

The Quran says that at the time of the Prophet Yusuf (Joseph), Egypt was ruled by a certain king, who, although a polytheist (mushrik), appointed the Prophet Yusuf to a high political position. He was made in-charge of food and agriculture, but he had more powers than this, acting, in a sense, as the deputy of the king, because in the ancient agricultural age the economy of countries was based essentially on agriculture. In other words, the Prophet Yusuf's position in the political system was that of the highest official.

 

If modern-day Muslims did not bind themselves to taqlid but, instead, approached the Quran in a spirit of ijtihad and pondered on it carefully, they would have realized that this incident about the Prophet Yusuf is a prophetic example for them to seek to emulate. They should understand that they can use the principle of power-sharing of modern democracy for their benefit, being confident that doing so is in accordance with a prophetic practice.

 

·      This is a translation of a portion of a chapter titled Taqlid Aur Ijtihad in Maulana Wahiduddin Khan's book Din-o-Shariat: Din-e Islam Ka Ek Fikri Muta'ala [Goodword Books, New Delhi, 2003, pp.214-224].

·      For more writings in English by Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, see www.cpsglobal.org. See also www.islampeaceandjustice.blogspot.com

 

Posted by collective at October 27, 2008 10:58 AM
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